PACOM
The U.S. Military In Asia

Note: This periodical was formerly entitled "Commanders Digest", classified D 2.15/2:

VOL. 1 NO. 7 JULY 1978

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By Admiral Maurice F. Weisn Comm

Many Americans tend to view world events and trends with a U.S.-European perspective. Such a perspective is understandable because of our close ethnic, cultural and historical ties with Europe. However, objectivity in understanding contemporary world trends can only be achieved by taking into full account the vast Asia-Pacific region.

This article will provide some insights into the unique characteristics of Asia and the Pacific, along with a review of United States military posture and how it fits together with our national interests in the region.

The words Asia and Pacific conjure images of far away lands and diverse cultures. Often, the region is viewed as an area of turmoil, with jungle battlefields, discontent, and frequent political upheavals.

Before focusing on U.S. Pacific theater military posture, preconceptions about Asia and the Pacific should be dispelled in order to achieve a better understanding of the dominant characteristics of the area.

From the standpoint of the Pacific Command, the area's most dominant characteristic is its vast size. The Pacific Command encompasses more than 100 million square miles, or more than half of the earth's surface. It stretches from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa, from the Arctic to the Antarctic. The area includes not only the Pacific Ocean, but the Indian Ocean as well—roughly 70 percent of the world's ocean area.

The diversity of Asia and the Pacific is striking. It includes many differing cultures, economies, religions and political systems. The economic scale includes Japan, one of the world's industrial giants with a gross national product (GNP) of $560 billion, to Burma, with its GNP of only $3 billion; and some of the island nations feature GNP's of less than $50 million.

The spectrum of diversity includes an array of countries in various stages of economic, political and social development, most undergoing very rapid change. The rising expectations of the people of these lands can be anticipated to create a certain amount of stress and tension,



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sometimes resulting in turmoil or conflict. Political, economic and social evolution will be hard pressed to keep pace with such dynamic forces of change.

Stability and Interdependence

Nevertheless, there are hopeful signs for both stability and greater interdependence within the Asia-Pacific region. An unstructured equilibrium now exists among the four major Asia-Pacific powers: The United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the Peoples Republic of China. In this four-power relationship and throughout the region, Japan plays a key role. Her influence spreads daily by way of trade, investment and various forms of economic assistance which are significant factors in regional development.

Since the Japanese appear willing to assume an increasing role of regional leadership, it is important to remember they are constitutionally restricted from assuming any military or security responsibilities of a regional nature. Until recently, the Japanese Government and public have avoided open discussion of defense issues. Although less emotional public dialogue on defense issues has emerged in the past few years, Japan remains determined to maintain a defensive military posture and continued reliance upon the security relationship with the United States. Japan's contribution to regional stability will remain confined to the economic, technological and political spheres.

To the south of Japan, the cohesive economic and political activity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN, offers further signs of improved regional stability through wakening to the need for greater regional interdependence and cooperation.

ASEAN, as an entity, has begun an economic dialogue with many nations of the region including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States. Recently, ASEAN has initiated an economic dialogue with the European Economic Community. Further extensions of ASEAN's regional economic integration are anticipated in the months ahead.

The U.S. military's job in the Pacific is, first and foremost, to provide a deterrent force which discourages acts of aggression or violence that threaten U.S. interests or those of her allies.



Trade and Economic Interests

It is within this setting of vastness, diversity and hopeful trends that U.S. national interests in Asia and the Pacific can be appropriately focused. First, the United States has strong and growing economic interests. U.S. trade with Asia-Pacific countries has for the past six years exceeded U.S. trade with the European Economic Community, and now accounts for 25 percent of all U.S. foreign trade. In 1977, U.S./Asia-Pacific trade was $62 billion—a 13 percent increase over 1976.

Meanwhile, Japan remains this country's number one overseas trading partner and largest market for agricultural exports. U.S. direct, private investments in Asia-Pacific countries have accumulated to some $16 million. The outlook for continued economic growth is favorable.

The United States obtains important amounts of strategic raw materials for the region. Australia supplies more than 90 percent of U.S.-imported zirconium and titanium and is also a source of manganese. Australia is also known to possess about one-third of the world's uranium reserves. The United States gets most of its tin and natural rubber from Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and receives large quantities of tungsten from Thailand. These minerals are important to commercial and industrial fields, and also have widespread applications in military and space programs.

One of the most critical economic and strategic interests of the United States in this area involves the flow of oil through the Indian Ocean. More than 90 percent of the Middle East's annual oil production, valued at about $87 billion per year, must traverse the Indian Ocean to reach the industrial economies of the world. This includes about 15 percent of the oil consumed annually by our country, plus, more significantly, 65 percent of western Europe's oil, nearly one third of Australia's and about 80 percent of Japan's.

Mutual Security Treaties

An important component of U.S. national interests is mutual security treaties with Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has bilateral defense agreements with Japan,

the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines; the tripartite ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty and the multilateral treaty with the countries of the Manila Pact, which includes Thailand. Subject to constitutional processes, these treaties commit the United States to come to the aid of these allies if they are attacked.

The dynamic nature of the Asian environment requires periodic re-evaluation of U.S. policies toward the region. The rift between the Soviets and the Chinese has had a major impact on U.S. policies in the region, as has the termination of the Vietnam War and the subsequent removal of U.S. military forces from the Southeast Asia mainland. Additionally, the United States has entered a period of changing relations with the Peoples Republic of China and is planning to initiate a gradual reduction of ground combat forces on the Korean peninsula.

U.S. Defense Posture

The fulfillment of U.S. policies and the protection of vital U.S. national interests in the region require an effective defense posture. The U.S. military's job in the Pacific is, first and foremost, to provide a deterrent force which discourages acts of aggression or violence that threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies. U.S. military presence, in concert with other components of national power, helps to maintain and foster a condition of regional stability creating an atmosphere that permits peaceful evolution and progress without outside interference. Deterrence requires readiness, which provides credible evidence that if deterrence fails, military forces can and will defend the United States and its national interests, which include treaty obligations.

Forward Basing Strategy

This vital mission in the Pacific theater is carried out primarily by means of a forward basing strategy. That strategy has a historical foundation that has been sustained, with significant variation in the level of forces, since World War II. Prior to World War II, the United States had about 160,000 military personnel in the Pacific. That figure increased to more than three million by 1945. After the war, force levels in the Pacific stabilized at about 180,000. U.S. force level totals reached approximately 640,000 and 800,000 during the Korean and Southeast Asia conflicts, respectively.

Today there are about 140,000 U.S. military personnel stationed west of Hawaii on Guam, in Japan, Korea and the Philippines. They include a squadron of Strategic Air Command B-52s, plus ballistic missile submarines on Guam, tactical fighter squadrons in the Philippines, Japan and Korea, and tactical airlift squadrons in the Philippines and Japan.

There are normally two carriers, two amphibious ready groups with Marine amphibious units embarked, about 20 cruisers and destroyers and a dozen support ships in the Western Pacific. Approximately half of these ships are underway at any one time, the remainder being in various ports throughout the region. Naval ocean patrol aircraft also operate from bases in Guam, the Philippines and Japan.

U.S. ground forces include the Army's infantry division in Korea, which will be withdrawn over a four to five year period; and a Marine division on Okinawa supported by Marine tactical air units.

Additional Pacific Command forces of about 180,000, that are considered not forward deployed, include Navy and Marine units in California. Forces in Hawaii include a naval fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor, a Marine brigade and Marine tactical aircraft, an Army infantry division plus the major Pacific headquarters of the four services.

These air, ground and naval forces are actively engaged in operational missions and readiness training. For example, there is an excellent air-to-ground live fire training area at Clark Air Base in the Philippines where a challenging simulated combat environment is provided for U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine combat elements, as well as for the Philippine Air Force.

In the Indian Ocean, U.S. forward presence consists of two destroyers and a command ship operating in the Persian Gulf area. Periodically, a naval task group is also deployed to the Indian Ocean. The task group might include an aircraft carrier or a cruiser and three or four

destroyers. The U.S. facility at Diego Garcia is an important, but limited asset. It serves primarily as a communications relay site and as a modest refueling station for reconnaissance and cargo aircraft. But, Diego Garcia is very austere and offers little potential for expansion.

Thus, U.S. forward basing posture can be regarded as anchored in Northeast Asia, which is strategically important because, there, the interests of the four major Asia-Pacific powers converge. It is also anchored in Southeast Asia with its strategic position astride key air and sea lines of communication. There is little flexibility to modify the U.S. base structure within the Pacific basin, even if such were considered.

The mere positioning of U.S. forward based forces should not be regarded as a sign of benign indifference to some other very important areas in the Pacific basin—the South Pacific island area, for example. This region is viewed with much interest because of its strategic significance geographically, U.S. political ties there along with those of Australia and New Zealand, and concern with recent Soviet and Peoples Republic of China diplomatic and aid initiatives, particularly in Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga.

U.S. air transport and allied coordination in the Pacific aid in deterring acts of aggression.

Soviet Pacific Capabilities

Of the four major Asia-Pacific powers, only the U.S. and Soviet Union currently have the capability to project military power throughout the region.

The Soviets have gradually, but very deliberately, strengthened their military capabilities on their Pacific side. About one quarter to a third of their military forces are deployed to the Soviet Far East. Their ground forces are primarily stationed along the Sino-Soviet Border. They are also positioned to protect their major Pacific Naval Bases and Maritime complexes at Vladivostok and Petropaulousk, the large airfield at Khabarovsk, and the Komsomolsk industrial center, one of the major industrial areas of the U.S.S.R. In the past decade, the Soviets have modernized these forces and improved their mobility with the deployment of mechanized vehicles and helicopters.

Soviet tactical air forces in the Pacific are based primarily in the area east of Lake Baikal and in the Vladivostok region. Since the early 1970s, new generation fighter aircraft have been added with substantially improved range, payload, avionics and electronic countermeasures.

Soviet heavy bomber aircraft in this area include jet and turboprop bombers which could

Planning is an essential part of maneuvers conducted between U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific.

strike targets as distant as Hawaii from their bases near Vladivostok. Their medium bomber force may soon be upgraded with the deployment of the swing wing Backfire.

The Soviet Pacific Navy has shown a marked improvement in capability in the past 10 years—not so much in the quantity of forces assigned, but in improved mobility, range and armament. They have demonstrated an ability and willingness to deploy naval forces and project their naval presence throughout the region. Whereas 10 years ago this naval force seldom ventured outside the Sea of Japan, today the Soviet Pacific Fleet routinely deploys to the East and South China Seas, the Philippine Sea, the South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean and as far east as the waters adjacent to the U.S. continental west coast. Their Indian Ocean naval presence has increased substantially since 1968, when they executed their first Indian Ocean deployment. On the average, the Soviets keep about 20 ships in the Indian Ocean, including about eight combatant ships.

Since last November, the Soviets have enhanced their Indian Ocean military capabilities. In Ethiopia, on the strategic Horn of Africa, they have increased their influence. Aided by about 15,000 Cuban surrogate troops, the Soviets now have the possibility of access to two Ethiopian Red Sea ports and five airfields. Just across the gulf in South Yemen, there is intensified Soviet use of the Port of Aden with potential access to five more airfields. Thus, from a strategic position astride the southern approaches to the Suez, the Soviet Union has a potential capability to interdict vital oil sea lanes from the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Soviet Indian Ocean naval presence has increased.

Other Communist Forces

Other communist military forces in the Pacific include those of the Peoples Republic of China, with the world's largest ground forces, an improving air force and navy, but limited present ability to project military power over great distances. The North Koreans have a large and formidable military establishment with about 75 percent of their ground forces deployed to within 50 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. And finally, the Vietnamese, who have by far the largest and strongest military establishment in Southeast Asia. Fighting between Vietnamese and Cambodian forces continues. The Vietnamese may also have as many as 30,000 troops in neighboring Laos.

Allied Capabilities

Friendly and allied countries of this region show a wide variance in military capabilities and orientation of defense forces. The Republic of Korea's forces are modern, well-equipped and in a high state of readiness. In conjunction with U.S. forces, they can deter and, if necessary, counter a North Korean attack. Japanese Self Defense Forces are highly trained and efficient. Australia and New Zealand have modest, but very professional and experienced military forces. The ASEAN countries do not have a common defense force. Their separate country armed forces are oriented primarily toward internal threats with limited defenses against an external aggressor. India has the major military force in South Asia, while France maintains an

Indian Ocean naval presence.

Given these military force postures in the Asia-Pacific region, in the light of what has been discussed already, any further examination of our defense requirements should ask: Is the U.S. forward basing strategy sound? Is it worthwhile for the United States to base and operate military forces overseas in this area? The answer to both questions clearly is, yes.

Forward based forces give the U.S. an ability to react much more quickly to show force, as in the deployment of an aircraft carrier group toward the East Coast of Africa when Idi Amin threatened U.S. citizens in Uganda last year; or to use force, such as in the recovery of the merchant ship MAYAGUEZ in 1975. U.S. forward bases and forces provide the operational flexibility and the support structure necessary to meet our treaty commitments. Certainly no reader would take exception to the observation that, none of our Asian allies could stand alone, without our help, against a major armed attack from the communist countries.

This article does not address the nuclear threat. United States strategic deterrent forces provide the well-known nuclear umbrella for our allies. But in the case of nonnuclear, or major conventional threat, the threat in the Pacific theater is complex.

The nerve centers for effectively carrying out operations in the Pacific are command posts like this one, (below), whether these missions be in the air or on the seas.

One possible scenario is a worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, perhaps stemming from the outbreak of war in Europe. In that situation,

a struggle for control of the lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions would likely result.

With the military forces now in the Pacific theater, the United States would have difficulty protecting the important sea lines of communication into the Western Pacific. Initially, there would be about an even chance of keeping those lines of communication open. But again, the threat definition is not clear cut and assessments depend heavily on assumptions of where, when and by whom hostilities are initiated; and the actions of allies and other nations.

So, the point is that except for the situation on the Korean Peninsula, a classical set-piece military threat scenario does not

exist in the Asia-Pacific region with opposing forces on opposite sides of some line or boundary.

Therefore, questions relative to Pacific theater defense requirements and the Asia-Pacific forward basing strategy should go deeper. What are we trying to deter? What are we trying to prevent from happening?

The answers lie in the fundamental concept of perceived national power. Military forces are one component of national power and their use, and usefulness, in peacetime as well as in war, should be assessed in the context of overall national interests and goals. Thus, in that context, deterrence especially in the Pacific theater means more than the prevention of war or discouragement of overt military aggression.

With that meaning of deterrence in mind, one can fully appreciate that the most important contribution of the forward basing strategy lies in the perception of U.S. power and the perception of U.S. resolve. Our forward military presence is widely perceived, by friends, allies and potential adversaries, as credible evidence of U.S. commitment and as the anchor or regional stability. Such perceptions should also be regarded as fragile and quick to change in response to changes in economic or political policy or to actual or indicated changes in our Pacific theater posture.

Important Component

U.S. forces deployed at forward bases are an important component in the perception of national power and resolve. The important thing to remember is that perceptions of relative power and resolve are critical factors in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region; and that our forward presence, because of its impact upon perceptions of power, helps to prevent destabilizing tendencies. U.S. Pacific Command Military Forces should not be regarded as the most important component of U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific Region. Our political and economic strength and policies are also important; for each must complement the other, while success of diplomatic and economic policies finds support in a strong U.S. military presence that emphasizes the forward basing strategy.

In essence, our forward basing posture in Asia and the Pacific, in concert with the political and economic policies of the U.S. Government, contributes to national goals by:

- Providing visible evidence of our strategic interest in the area and of our commitment to allies;
- Providing security and protection for the substantial U.S. economic interests in the region;
- Deterring the expansion of military influence which would create destabilizing pressures in the area;
- Limiting Soviet flexibility and military options in a European or worldwide conflict;
- Providing an important counterbalance in the Sino-Soviet relationship;
- Providing the psychological security necessary for economic and political development, and the growth of regional interdependence.

The Asia-Pacific region is a vast, diverse, rapidly changing area where embryonic, but potential trends toward stability and greater interdependence are developing concurrent with increasing Soviet military capabilities. The United States has important economic and strategic interests in the area.

The President has stated that the United States will remain a Pacific power. U.S. military posture will continue to emphasize the forward basing strategy and its contribution to stability and peaceful evolution in the Asia-Pacific region.

COMMAND

Vol. 1, No. 1: July 1978

A publication of the Department of Defense to provide official and professional information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies, programs and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense. Published monthly by the American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va., 22209, a unified activity of the American Forces Information Service, OASD (PA). Reproduction of content is authorized.

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PACIFIC COMMAND

An Orientation

THE PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM), headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii, has approximately 320,000 military personnel assigned within its area. In addition, more than 30,000 Department of Defense civilian employees complement the military forces.

The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), Adm. Maurice F. Weisner, normally exercises operational command of major combat-ready forces through Navy and Air Force component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG), and commanders of three subordinate unified commands in Korea, Japan and Taiwan. In certain areas where there are no subordinate unified commands, CINCPAC has designated representatives who coordinate matters of joint concern.

Admiral Weisner

Army Forces in the Pacific

The majority of U.S. Army forces within PACOM are located in Korea, Japan and Hawaii. CINCPAC exercises operational control of assigned Army units in Korea and Japan through subordinate unified commanders and those in Hawaii through the USACSG.

Approximately 33,000 Army personnel are assigned to the Eighth Army which continues to meet United States guarantees for the defense of the Republic of Korea. The Commander of Eighth Army is also Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander U.S. Forces, Korea.

Across the Sea of Japan, U.S. Army, Japan, provides offshore procurement and maintenance facilities with some 2,800 personnel. U.S. Army Garrison in Okinawa is the principal off-shore agency for logistical support of Army forces in the Pacific.

The U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH), is the senior Army headquarters and reports to Forces Command Headquarters at Ft. McPherson, Ga. Also, USACSG at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, a Department of Army field operating agency, provides CINCPAC liaison, advice and assistance.

The 25th Infantry Division, based at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii is the Army's Pacific Reserve Force. The Division is composed of two infantry brigades of the active Army, plus supporting artillery

units, service and administrative elements and organic aviation units. The Tropic Lightning Division is rounded out by the 29th Infantry Brigade of the Hawaii National Guard and the 100th Battalion of the 442d Infantry, U.S. Army Reserve.

USASCH strength, including the 25th Infantry Division, is approximately 17,000 active duty soldiers, and some 6,000 civilian employees.

Pacific Fleet

The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command in area of responsibility, number of subordinate commands, and manpower. More than 750 element commands comprise the Fleet organization, and assets include more than 240 ships (active and reserve), 55 shore installations, 1,800 aircraft, and approximately 225,000 men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINPACFLT), as the naval commander in chief of a large segment of the Navy's operating forces, is a direct subordinate of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy chain of command and of CINCPAC in the unified chain. Under CINCPACFLT, two fleet, six type and four force commanders exercise direct command of forces assigned to them.

With headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the Pacific Fleet's assets include six aircraft carriers, 16 cruisers, 63 destroyers and frigates, 44 submarines, and 86 amphibious, auxiliary, and replenishment vessels. They are organized to respond to many types of threats and situations, ranging from combat to lending assistance during and after natural disasters.

In war, the Pacific Fleet's mission is to conduct strategic and tactical combat operations in pursuit of victory; in peace, its mission is to deter aggression and provide a point of contact between the United States and friendly nations. The dual mission involves four vital capabilities: protection of sea lanes, strategic deterrence, projection of power ashore and overseas presence.

Pacific Fleet forces, with their mobile air power, surface warships and amphibious units with embarked Marines, are frequently the only forces that can be brought to bear quickly and effectively within its vast area of responsibility without dependence upon forward bases, overflights of foreign soil, landing rights or other support requiring the consent of a third nation.

Camp Smith Main Gate

Such forces can be brought close enough to an area of threat to provide an almost instantaneous reaction capability, while still avoiding any actual commitment. This increases the alternatives available in meeting a threat—if power is to be projected ashore—makes possible greater control over the use and amount of force applied.

CINCPACFLT embodies a strategy of a realistic deterrence based on modern and flexible naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans that are ready and able to meet all challenges affecting world peace.

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

The 70,000 men and women of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, are located in three general areas throughout the Pacific.

The First Marine Amphibious Force heads up the Eastern units at Camp Pendleton, El Toro, and Twenty-nine Palms, all in Southern California, and Yuma, Ariz. These are the home bases of the First Marine Division, Third Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Troops, Pacific and the First Force Service Support Group.

In the mid-Pacific area, the First Marine Brigade is homebased at Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe, Hawaii. The brigade is an integrated air-ground team which provides units for various contingencies in the Pacific.

In the Western Pacific on Okinawa and mainland Japan, the Third Marine Amphibious Force, consists of the Third Marine Division, First Marine Aircraft Wing and the Third Force Service Support Group. These units frequently deploy to Korea, the Philippines and various other areas of the Pacific.

FMFPAC is responsive to two command channels. The commanding general reports to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on all matters connected with the training, readiness, and administration of FMFPAC, and is responsive to CINCPACFLT for all operational matters. In a similar way, FMFPAC subordinate unit commanders in the Western and Eastern Pacific report to the Commanding General of FMFPAC and to the commanders of the U.S. SEVENTH and THIRD Fleets, respectively.

FMFPAC dates from 1944 when it was created to control the six Marine divisions and five Marine aircraft wings which were deployed to the Pacific in World War II. Since then, its units have fought in both Korea and Vietnam.

The FMFPAC with support of Marine Corps Bases, Pacific is capable of providing forces for any contingencies which may arise.

These forces are responsive and combat ready. Their training is intensive and comprehensive.

Pacific Air Forces

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), headquartered at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, is the Air Force component of the unified Pacific Command.

The Commander in Chief, PACAF has responsibilities to both CINCPAC and to the Air Force Chief of Staff. As CINCPAC's principal air advisor, PACAF Commander in Chief has overall responsibility for air defense of land areas in the PACOM area. PACAF assigned and supporting units can provide the entire spectrum of tactical and special air operations.

Other PACAF responsibilities include military assistance to air forces of friendly nations and support for other Air Force commands operating in the Pacific.

The Commander-in-Chief, PACAF exercises command over more than 33,000 operational and supporting personnel stationed at bases and facilities in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Australia, Hawaii, Wake and Johnston Islands and Eniwetok Atoll.

PACAF is organized into two numbered air forces: the Fifth and the Thirteenth. Fifth Air Force, headquartered in Japan, operates in North Asia. Thirteenth Air Force, headquartered in the Republic of the Philippines, operates in Southeast Asia.

PACAF's Hawaii-based units are the 326th Air Division and the 15th Air Base Wing. Additionally, the Strategic Air Command, a separate specified command not part of PACAF, has the 43rd Strategic Wing located at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam.

After the end of the air war in Southeast Asia, PACAF's forces were dramatically restructured. Assets remaining in the Pacific were consolidated and regrouped to better support the shift in focus. Providing credible deterrence and maintaining combat readiness are the central issues of concern in PACAF today.

PACAF has been reequipping with later versions of the F-4 Phantom II and possesses a wide variety of reconnaissance, Wild Weasel, air superiority and close air support versions of that aircraft.

The 27th Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor Squadron at Clark Air Base, Philippines, has received new F-5E Tiger II tactical fighters to train PACAF aircrews.

A variety of forward air control, tactical airlift and other aircraft are assigned throughout the Pacific and provide support for PACAF's many peacetime and wartime roles. In addition, PACAF's 326th Air Division at Wheeler Air Force Base, Hawaii, exercises operational control of F-4C interceptor alert forces belonging to the Hawaii Air National Guard.

In 1977, PACAF units participated in over 100 uni-service, joint service and combined exercises involving the military forces of a number of our Pacific allies.

Allied personnel such as this maintenance man (above) take part in Pacific maneuvers while U.S. forces test a missile in the Republic of Korea.

Commanders Digest Receives . . .

NEW NAME, LOOK, FORMAT

Commencing with this issue, the **Commanders Digest** will have a new name, a new look, and a new editorial format. Now entitled **Command** magazine, the publication for senior U.S. military commanders and their staffs will be issued monthly, printed in four-color, and feature single subjects supplemented by additional defense policy summaries.

For this first issue of **Command,** the Defense Department solicited the views of Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, for an in-depth analysis of United States military power in the Pacific. The Admiral's article—"A Military View of Asia"— begins on page 2.

In addition, this issue also presents a summary of the missions, capabilities and equipment of CINCPAC's components—land, sea, and air—assigned to the Pacific theater.

Future issues of **Command** will present important defense policy statements by the Secretary of Defense, his principal civilian assistants, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commanders.

Meanwhile, in our next and all following issues you'll find a capsule news brief about DoD happenings, along with a special editorial section called ***Dateline: R&D.*** This column will advise commanders of the latest advances in new weapons, research, and acquisition.

Finally, in this issue, as in all others, you'll discover a listing of senior military officer promotions, assignments, and retirements. Thank you.

The Editors

evolution of a magazine

Fourteen years ago the Defense Department's Office of Information and Education began issuing a new four-page pamphlet every two weeks entitled, ***for Commanders*** (1). A year later an expanded version was retitled ***Defense Department Digest*** (2) and in another 12 months, the publication received its third name change, ***Commanders Digest*** (3). The mini-newspaper format with tid-bits from various Defense agencies was abandoned in 1973 when the publication went to a magazine (4) layout with a new logotype. The first touch of color was presented in 1975 (5) and the first all-color issue (6) was published last year. The content in recent years has focused on a different single subject each issue and has won a large audience of military commanders, their senior staffs and civilian advisors. Now, in a major effort to upgrade the publication to a full-fledged, four-color magazine that speaks for the Secretary of Defense, the American Forces Press Service presents ***COMMAND***.



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

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CHANGE OF COMMAND

Retirements

Lt. Gen. DeWitt C. Smith Jr., deputy chief of staff for Personnel, U.S. Army, will be retired in grade effective Aug. 1.

Lt. Gen. Robert L. Nichols, deputy chief of staff for Manpower, Hq. U.S. Marine Corps, was retired in grade effective July 1, 1978.

Lt. Gen. LeRoy J. Manor, chief of staff, Pacific Command, retired in his current grade July 1, 1978.

Lt. Gen. George E. Schafer, Air Force surgeon general was retired in his current grade effective July 31, 1978.

Lt. Gen. Woodrow W. Vaughan, Director, Defense Logistics Agency, retired in his current grade on July 1, 1978.

VAdm. James B. Wilson, Chief of Naval Education and Training, was nominated to be retired in grade effective Aug. 1, 1978.

VAdm. Patrick Hannifin, director, Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired in grade on July 1, 1978.

VAdm. Donald D. Engen, USN, Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, has been nominated to be retired in grade effective Sept. 1, 1978.

RAdm. William O. Miller, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, to be retired Aug. 1, 1978.

Reassignments

Lt. Gen. James A. Hill, commander in chief, Pacific Air Forces, has been named vice chief of staff, for the Air Force. He also has been nominated for promotion to general.

Lt. Gen. Marion L. Boswell, commander, Alaskan Air Command and commander, Alaskan North American Air Defense has been named chief of staff, Pacific Command.

Lt. Gen. Edgar S. Harris Jr., vice commander-in-chief, Strategic Air Command, will become commander of Eighth Air Force at Barksdale AFB, La.

Lt. Gen. James V. Hartinger, commander, Ninth Air Force at Shaw AFB, S.C., will go to commander, Twelfth Air Force at Bergstrom AFB, Texas.

Lt. Gen. Arnold W. Braswell, director for Plans & Policy, J-5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, goes to commander, Ninth Air Force at Shaw AFB, S.C.

Lt. Gen. Richard L. Lawson, commander of Eighth Air Force at Barksdale AFB, will become director, Plans & Policy, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lt. Gen. James D. Hughes, commander of 12th Air Force (Tactical) at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, has been named to be commander-in-chief, Pacific Air Forces at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

Maj. Gen. Gerald J. Post, assistant deputy chief of staff/Systems and Logistics, Hq., U.S. Air Forces, goes to director, Defense Logistics Agency. He also has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general.

Maj. Gen. Paul W. Myers, commander, Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center at San Antonio, Texas, becomes surgeon general of the Air Force. He also has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general.

RAdm. Charles E. McDowell, deputy judge advocate general of the Navy, goes to judge advocate general of the Navy.



Lt. Gen. Hill

Lt. Gen. Nichols

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